• lysdexic@programming.dev
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      11 months ago

      To start Europe should have secure phones made in EU.

      Doesn’t switching instant messaging services count as a start? Switching hardware is far harder than switching software.

      Also, local messaging systems also determine where your traffic goes and who controls that data. If you have a french messaging service with data centers in france routing traffic between people in France, you are in a far better shape.

      • gnygnygny@lemm.ee
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        11 months ago

        When Real-Time Bidding allows foreign states and non-state actors to obtain compromising sensitive personal data about key European personnel and leaders to get location data, time-stamps, websites and apps activities; switching to a local messaging service appears to be a weak patch. You can get an overview of the actual situation here : https://www.iccl.ie/digital-data/europes-hidden-security-crisis/

        • lysdexic@programming.dev
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          11 months ago

          appears to be a weak patch.

          It’s not a patch. It’s eliminating an attack vector, and the one which is more pervasive and easier to exploit.

          Security-minded people pay far more attention to what software you run than what hardware you have.

  • pootriarch@poptalk.scrubbles.tech
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    11 months ago

    i rather doubt a government would push people out of signal-protocol apps and into Some Other App if they didn’t already have a backdoor into the designated substitute

  • joelimgu@lemmy.world
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    11 months ago

    I can understand the WhatsApp part, its a closed source app but it makes no sense to ban an open source app bc of security concerns, just order a study of the source code to validate it

    • TWeaK@lemm.ee
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      11 months ago

      A far better reason not to use WhatsApp is that it is run by Facebook. It was also a primary vector for Pegasus.

  • Cheradenine@sh.itjust.works
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    11 months ago

    I downloaded and scanned it with App Manager. Google play billing, another Google something, and telemetry from someone else. Also has the Google maps api. Pass

    Edit: I use SimpleX which has many of the same features (no phone number, ETEE, lots more) but is FOSS, has no trackers, has been audited by Trail of Bits, and can be self hosted if you wish. I am very happy with it after leaving Signal.

    • onlinepersona@programming.dev
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      11 months ago

      It’s about digital sovereignty. France (or at least the prime minister) wants the government to control its own infrastructure. IMO, this is good and if they’re serious, it will mean getting rid of Microsoft, Apple, Google and everything else in governmental institutions. Best case would be if they also got rid of all of that stuff in schools to teach the next generation how to use FLOSS stuff.

      Seeing as they picked Olvid though… I’m not sure how serious they are about FLOSS. Probably more about keeping the money in France instead of it being siphoned off to some company in the US.

          • Nia@lemmy.ml
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            11 months ago

            Just because everything checks out in principle doesn’t mean it’s actually secure. First off, we have no certainty of the client code running; it’s open source, sure, but unless they ensure reproducible builds - which, given it’s on the Play store (and I assume Apple app store), they can’t be, since the binaries must be signed - we have no way of knowing whether the code actually being downloaded and run is actually the same as the FOSS version. Further, even if it is, it may have intentional subtle vulnerabilities meant to be used by the French govt (so would easily pass certification by having the ANSSI be instructed top-down to overlook certain things), or it may be that the server can trigger a known bug resulting in leakage of data. At an even more paranoid level, it’s possible that the encryption itself is faulty; the specification says it uses aes256 and ed25519 which is about as battle-tested as it gets, but the PRNG seems to be mostly their own innovation. It specifies a minimum of 32 bytes of entropy, which (though cryptography is not my expertise, so at this point I’m wildly speculating) is probably trivial to send or embed in some other communication with the server e.g. by ensuring the PRNG is deterministic after the first keygen and faulty in some known way and sending over a future result.

            I wouldn’t trust the French government.

            • Krafty Kactus@sopuli.xyz
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              11 months ago

              Seeing as the French government was going after a group of people for using Signal and other ‘clandestine’ behaviors, I’m with you in distrusting them.